Your browser doesn't support javascript.
Show: 20 | 50 | 100
Results 1 - 2 de 2
Filter
Add filters

Language
Document Type
Year range
1.
medrxiv; 2022.
Preprint in English | medRxiv | ID: ppzbmed-10.1101.2022.10.10.22280850

ABSTRACT

Cancer patients are at high risk of severe COVID-19 with high morbidity and mortality. Further, impaired humoral response renders SARS-CoV-2 vaccines less effective and treatment options are scarce. Randomized trials using convalescent plasma are missing for high-risk patients. Here, we performed a multicenter trial (https://www.clinicaltrialsregister.eu/ctr-search/trial/2020-001632-10/DE) in hospitalized patients with severe COVID-19 within four risk groups (1, cancer; 2, immunosuppression; 3, lab-based risk factors; 4, advanced age) randomized to standard of care (CONTROL) or standard of care plus convalescent/vaccinated anti-SARS-CoV-2 plasma (PLASMA). For the four groups combined, PLASMA did not improve clinically compared to CONTROL (HR 1.29; p=0.205). However, cancer patients experienced shortened median time to improvement (HR 2.50, p=0.003) and superior survival in PLASMA vs. CONTROL (HR 0.28; p=0.042). Neutralizing antibody activity increased in PLASMA but not in CONTROL cancer patients (p=0.001). Taken together, convalescent/vaccinated plasma may improve COVID-19 outcome in cancer patients unable to intrinsically generate an adequate immune response.


Subject(s)
Neoplasms , COVID-19
2.
ssrn; 2020.
Preprint in English | PREPRINT-SSRN | ID: ppzbmed-10.2139.ssrn.3612019

ABSTRACT

The COVID-19 pandemic has been accompanied by reprehensible cyber operations directed against medical facilities and capabilities, as well as by a flood of misinformation. Our goal in this article is to map out the various obligations of states under general international law law and under human rights law with regard to malicious cyber and misinformation operations conducted by state and non-state actors during the pandemic. First, we consider cyber operations against health care facilities and capabilities, including public health activities operated by the government, and how such operations, when attributable to a state, can violate the sovereignty of other states, the prohibitions of intervention and the use of force, and the human rights of the affected individuals. Second, we perform a similar analysis with regard to state misinformation operations during the pandemic, especially those that directly or indirectly affect human life and health, whether such misinformation is targeting the state’s own population or those of third states. Finally, we turn to the positive obligations that states have to protect their populations from hostile cyber and misinformation operations, to the limits that human rights law imposes on efforts to combat misinformation, and to protective obligations towards third states and their populations. We argue that international law can play a robust role in addressing the COVID-19 pandemic. For the most part, the parameters of the relevant legal rules are reasonably clear. But significant areas of uncertainty remain. For instance, at least one state, wrongly in our view, rejects the existence of the general international law rule most likely to be breached by COVID-19-related cyber operations, sovereignty. Another major issue is the extraterritorial application of the human rights obligations to respect and protect the rights to life and health in the cyber context, which we examine in detail.It is difficult to find anything positive about this horrific global pandemic. However, perhaps it can help draw attention to the criticality of moving forward the international cyber law discourse among states much more quickly than has been the case to date. Many states have been cautious about proffering their interpretation of the applicable law, and to some extent rightfully so, but caution has consequences and can leave us normatively ill-prepared for the next crisis. Some states have condemned the COVID-19-related cyber operations, although seldom on the basis of international law as distinct from political norms of responsible state behavior. Hopefully, they will add legal granularity to future statements. But all states, human rights courts, human rights monitoring bodies, the academy, the private sector and NGOs must take up the challenge presented by this tragic pandemic to move the law governing cyberspace in the right direction.


Subject(s)
COVID-19
SELECTION OF CITATIONS
SEARCH DETAIL